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NORMAN N. BOWSHER
OST INTEREST iates have risen to historically
high levels in recent months. This development, in
view of present law, has caused serious problems to
develop in the credit markets because in most juris-
dictions usury restrictions on the payment of interest
have generally remained at previously established
lower levels. The consequence of this has been that
borrowers who are willing to pay the competitive rate
for funds often find that they are legally unable to
obtain financing. As a result, they are faced with the
choice of either circumventing the law to obtain the
desired funds or losing out to other borrowers who
may not be svilhng to bid as much, but who are
legally able to contract because of the nonuniformity
of usury laws.
Despite the credit market distortions caused by ceil-
ings on interest rates, usury laws have been retained
in most jurisdictions. It is the intent of this article to
provide some insight and perspective on the value of
such restrictions by reviewing briefly the history and
justification of such laws, the role of interest rates,
and some of the effects of interest rate restrictions.’
Usury laws have been traced back to the dawn of
recorded history. Both legal and religious restrictions
on interest charges were imposed in ancient times.2
The early Babylonians permitted credit but limited
the rate of interest. One of the earliest writings of the
IPrevious discussions of interest rate controls were given by
Clifton B. Luttrell, “Interest Rate Controls — Perspective,
Purpose, and Problems,” this Review (Septcunbcr 1968), pp.
6-14, and Charlotte F. Ruebling, “The Aduninistration of
Regulation Q,” this Review (February 1970), pp. 29-40.
2
See Sidney 1-loruer, A Iiistorij of Interest Rates (New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1963).
Bible (Deuteronomy 23:19-20) stated, “Thou shalt not
lend upon usury to thy brother, ...Unto a stranger
thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother
thou shalt not lend upon usury ....“ In the New
Testament (Luke 6:35) the admonition was broadened
lend freely, hoping nothing thereby.”
In Greece, Aristotle considered money to be sterile,
and that the breeding of money from money was
unnatural and justly hated. During the period of
the Roman Republic, interest charges were forbidden,
but they were permitted during the time of the Ro-
man Empire.
During the early Middle Ages religious leaders
treated the subject niore thoroughly, and reached the
same conclusion — that interest on loans was unjust.
The exploitation of the poverty-stricken by rich and
powerful creditors who lent money at interest was
considered sinful to the Christians of that period, who
stressed humility and charity as among the greatest
virtues and played down the value of earthly goods.
Secular legislation responded to the Church’s influence
and, in general, interest charges and usury were re-
garded as synonymous.~
The increase in economic activity and expansion
of personal freedom that came with the Renaissance
forced modifications in the prevailing views concern-
ing interest rates. Recognizing that man was imper-
fect, Martin Luther and other 15th century reformers
began to concede that creditors could not be pre-
vented from charging interest. In the 16th century
John Calvin rejected the scriptural basis for interest
prohibition on grounds of conflicting interpretations
and changed circumstances, but still advocated some
3
hugene von Böhnm-Bawerk, Capital and Interest, trans.
George Huneke and Hans Sennholz ( South 1-lolland, Illi-
nois: Libertarian Press, 1959), pp. 13-24.
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control. Turgot, an 18th century French economist,
claimed that money was the equivalent of land,
and hence the owner should not be inclined to loan
his money unless he could expect a return as great as
he would obtain through the purchase of land.4
Legal restrictions on the payment of interest were
generally relaxed in the 18th century, but the belief
continued that the people who needed to borrow
funds should be protected against overly high charges.
Consequently, most nations maintained legal maxi-
mum usury rates at “reasonable” levels,
Usury laws in the United States were inherited, in
large part, from the British in colonial days. While
these laws generally remain in force in the United
States, Great Britain, after intense pressure in the
early 19th century, repealed these and other restric-
tions on commerce and trade in 1854.~
One factor complicating attempts to maintain in-
terest rate ceilings arose from the fact that risks and
administrative expenses in making very small loans
were often so great that legitimate dealers could not
handle such advances with prevailing rate ceilings.
This situation fostered illegitimate loan “sharks” with
exorbitant interest charges. As a result, it was even-
tually recognized that higher rates should be per-
mitted on small loans, and the small loan laws emerged.
As noted, ethical and religious arguments have
been relied on to a great extent to justify either the
prohibition or limitation of interest payments. Another
factor which has been instrnmental in sustaining sup-
port for usury laws has been public opinion which
generally viewed the small borrower as an underdog
at the mercy of large well-financed institutions, As a
consequence of this public attitude, legislators have
been reluctant to raise or eliminate interest rate
ceilings.
Several economic arguments also have been ad-
vanced to justify usury laws, and these considerations
tend to bolster the moral and political reluctance to
raise rate ceilings. The first of these arguments asserts
that whereas most lenders are knowledgeable about
conditions in the particular credit market in which
they operate, it is readily observable that a sizable
number of borrowers are unsophisticated and naive.
It is contended that these borrowers are concerned
only with obtaining credit and do not even know what
~Ibid, pp. 25-60.
5
Homer, A History of Interest Rates, p. 187,
rate of interest they are paying. Furthermore, rela-
tively few make a serious effort to study conditions
or to shop around for better terms or better timing.
Finally it is argued that contracts made with such
unknowing borrowers at rates above those existing in
the market for similar types of loans represent a dis-
tortion of competitive forces and provide a windfall
to lenders.
A similar argument for the regulation of interest
rates is related to the comparative market power of
borrowers and lenders. Since lenders are usually fewer
in number and larger in resources than borrowers, it
is contended that they haave market power which can
be used to command artificially high rates. Hence,
usury laws provide competitive balance between the
two groups.
Another argument for interest rate regulation is
concerned with the impact of lower interest rates on
the economy. It has been contended that low interest
rates are desirable to encourage more investment and
consumption and promote faster economic growth.
Those who oppose interest rate restrictions view
credit markets as relatively efficient when left alone
to operate freely. According to this position free com-
petitive markets lead to an optimum allocation of
resources and maximum individual satisfaction. Con-
sequently, interferences with noi-mal credit flows, by
use of imposed ceilings on lending or deposit rates,
can only create inefficiencies in financial markets
which hamper production and exert an adverse influ-
ence on the distribution of goods and services,
It has been charged that maximum loan rates are
necessary because credit applicants are gullible and
would enter into oppressive contracts without such
protection. But, are not individuals just as likely to
be gullible in their dealings in other markets? Why
then is the credit market singled out as an area to
promulgate legal restrictions against such oppressive
contracts? More importantly, has this special attention
had its intended effects? That is, can and do these
laws protect the uninfonned from exploitation, and
can the benefits of this protection be justified in view
of the attendant social costs? Existing imperfections
in credit markets could probably be reduced to a
greater extent and with less cost by fostering greater
competition among lenders. Also, education and coun-
seling of borrowers may be a more efficient method
to improve their performance than imposing rigid
ceilings.
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In most credit markets competiton is very keen.
Major lenders include commercial banks, savings and
loan associations, insurance companies, mutual sav-
ings banks, mortgage companies, sales finance com-
panies, personal finance companies, credit unions, real
estate investment trusts, fann credit agencies, retail-
ers, and individuals. It is relatively easy to establish
a business for lending funds, except for restrictions
imposed by the Government. In most cases where
competition is lacking in a given market, it has resulted
from legal limitations on entry or activities. In prac-
tice, competitive forces have kept most market interest
rates below usury ceilings for most of the past forty
years.
For a brief period, artificially holding interest rates
down probably does stimulate investment and con-
tribute to economic expansion. 1-lowever, maintain-
ing arbitrarily low rates by imposing ceilings discour-
ages saving at the same time that it stimulates invest-
ment demand, placing upward pressure on interest
rates. As a result, rates can only be maintained at the
lower level by some form of nonprice rationing (which
tends to reduce efficiency and offset, in the longer
run, the sought-after investment increases) or by the
creation of money and credit at progressively faster
rates (which contributes to accelerating inflation).
Interest rates play a strategic role in the economy.
Interest rates are prices, and, as is true of all prices,
they serve a rationing function. They are the prices
that allocate available funds, and hence command
over resources, among competing uses. Normally, the
term “interest rate” is used in reference to the return
on marketable securities or a loan of funds. However,
the concept of “interest rate” can he applied to all
goods. The rate of interest reflects the price of the
convenience of earlier availability, the preference for
more certain rather than less certain consumption
rights, and the economy’s ability to use resources to
increase output.
To the borrower, interest rates represent a cost,
and as such, influence investment and consumption
decisions. To the saver, they represent a return and
affect decisions regarding the amount to be saved. To
wealth holders and managers of funds. interest rates
or yields are a common denominator for evaluating
alternative fonns of holding wealth and alternative
avenues for placing funds.
At any time, some individuals or businesses find
that with their incomes, tastes, and investment pros-
pects it is not desirable to pay the going rate for
funds. They are “priced out of the market,” just as
there are those who find that at current prices it is
not expedient to hire a servant, eat steak, or pur-
chase a luxury automobile. Any movement in interest
rates (as with other prices) will cause a reevaluation
of projects which require the borrowing of funds.
Throughout most of the period since the l920s,
usury laws have been ineffective because the interest
ceilings were at levels above prevailing market rates.
However, with the rise in inflation, and consequently
interest rates, since the mid-l960s, usury laws have
had a significant impact on many credit markets.
Their effects have been quite arbitrary and have
weighed heaviest on those credit seekers generally
considered most risky.
Professor Roger Miller contends that usury legisla-
tion often adversely affects the ones it is designed to
protect.6 He illustrates this conclusion by citing the
Washington state experience, where consumer loans
from credit card companies were generally at an an-
nual rate of 18 percent. Consumer advocates felt that
this rate was much too lugh, and that poor people
would be aided by a lower charge. In 1968, the maxi-
mum rate was lowered by referendum to 12 percent.
However, at the lower rate the amount of credit de-
manded exceeded the amount supplied, and the peo-
ple with the weakest credit worthiness were the
ones denied credit at 12 percent. Welfare mothers,
people with records of unstable employment, students,
and the elderly fell into this category. Gainers from
the reduced rates were the ones who had the most
wealth, best jobs, and the highest probability of being
able to repay the loan.
Sometimes those higher risk borrowers, who are re-
fused credit from legitimate lenders because of usury
laws, seek funds from loan sharks who ignore the legis-
lated ceilings. Costs of operating outside the law are
relatively high, and competition among such unscrupu-
lous lenders is severely limited; hence, some interest
rates may be several times the level that would have
existed in the absence of ceilings.7
As market rates approach usury ceilings, venture
or developmental credit, which of course contains a
higher than average degree of risk, becomes limited.
°RogerL. Miller, Economies To&y (San Francisco: Canfield
Press, 1973), pp. 244-250.
~John M. Seidl, “Let’s Compete with Loan Sharks,” Harvard
Business Review (May-June 1970), pp. 69-77.
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Since such credit can only be extended by lenders
at a higher rate of interest to compensate for the
additional risk involved, these loans are among the
first to be affected as market rates rise relative to
usury ceilings. Without such venture capital, the en-
trepreneur is frustrated, and economic progress and
growth is hampered.5
By contrast, the volume of credit flowing to wealthy
individuals and sound established businesses may be
as great or greater under severe usury restrictions as
under free market conditions.°Since low usury maxi-
mums prevent other individuals and firms from effec-
tively competing for funds, a greater share of the
available funds tends to flow to lower risk applicants.
The anticompetitive effects of these laws are thus
spread from credit to product markets.
In general, usury laws tend to be more restrictive
in the central section of the country than in states on
or near either coast. In several Eighth District states
usury laws have been a major obstacle in credit mar-
kets. In Illinois and Missouri the current general
usury ceiling is a very low 8 percent, and in Kentucky
the ceiling is 8.5 percent. In each of these states,
however, exemptions from the ceiling exist, such as
for corporations. Despite the exemptions, many credit
flows have been interrupted because of the ceilings,
particularly away from potential individual borrowers,
Arkansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee have some-
what higher usury ceilings — 10 percent in each case.
However, because of the lack of legal exemptions
from the maximums in Arkansas and Tennessee, the
ceilings have been causing substantial disruptions to
borrowers, lenders, and the general economy of these
states. This has been particularly noticeable since
April when the prime rate on business loans nationally
climbed above 10 percent. During May and June of
this year, commercial and industrial loans declined
9.3 percent at weekly reporting banks in Memphis and
Little Rock, while they were rising 2.8 percent at
all weekly reporting banks in the nation. In the cor-
5
Stndies show that in those slates permitting higher rates,
lenders tenrl to expand credit opportunities. Lenders appear
more willing to accept higher risk of losses if the rate is
sufficient to compensate for l,ad debt, investigatiol4, and
collection expenses. Main-ice B. Condzwaard, “Price Ceilings
and Credit Rationing,” Jonroof of Finance ( March 1968),
pp. 183-184.
OThis may not always he the ease, because the total volmuc
of loanable funds is likely to he smaller under severe interest
rate ceilings. Saving is discouraged relative to consumption
and funds tend to flow out of the jurisdiction or directly from
savers into venture capital.
responding period last year, when market rates were
below the ceilings, these loans changed little in Mem-
phis and Little Rock and rose 2.9 percent nationally.
In an effort to alleviate hardship, the ceiling in
Mississippi was raised to 10 percent from the extremely
restrictive 8 percent level, effective July 1, 1974. In
Illinois, the ceiling for residential loans was raised on
July 12, 1974 from 8 percent to 9.5 percent for the
period until July 1, 1975. Among Eighth District states,
only Indiana has had credit markets relatively free
from usury restrictions.
Quantitative measures of the volume of potential
loans affected by tIme rate restrictions are not avail-
able, but comments from market participants indicate
that it is sizable. The following sketchy, indirect evi-
dence also indicates that the impact has been great.
In the first four months of this year, the average
interest rate on FHA 3O-year mortgages was 8.78 per-
cent nationally; in the corresponding period last year
the rate was 7.62 percent. Two District states had
usury laws applicable to home mortgages that were
between these rates — Mississippi and Missouri at 8
percent. In these two states residential construction
contracts fell 34 percent from the first four months
last year to time comparable period tIns year, accord-
ing to F. W. Dodge data. In Arkansas, Indiana, and
iennessee, which had 10 percent or higher usury ccii-
ings, and Kentucky and Illinois, which exempted cer-
tain residences fromn the ceilings, residential contracts
declined 16 percent. The average decrease for the
nation was 21 percent over the same period.
By contrast, contracts for nonresidential construc-
tion, which are frequently exempted from usury ceil-
ings, rose 8 percent in Mississippi and Missouri from
the first four months last year to the first four months
this year. This was about the same as the 9 percent
gain in Arkansas, Ilhnois, Indiana, Tennessee and
Kentucky and greater than the 2 percent nationally
in the same period.
Insured savings and loan associations in Missouri
had a 74 percent smaller increase in savings “deposits”
in April and May this year than they did in the cor-
responding months last year. Nevertheless,, these asso-
ciations purchased 10 percent more mortgages in
the two months this year when the national market
rate on mortgages was above the state’s usury ceiling
than in the like period last year when the market
rate was below the ceiling. This seemingly contradic-
tory development can he explained by noting that
the bulk of these purchases were from states where the
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STATE USURY LAWS5
State Basic Rote Some Moior Exceptions
Alabama 8% For-individuals, firms, partnerships, associations, and nan-profit organizations the rate is 8% on loans
to $100,000 and is% on loans above that, These same groups may agree to pay mare than 15%
on loans greater than $100,000. Far corporations the maximum rate is 8% an loans to $10,000,
15% on loans between $10,000 to SI00,000 and no ceiling on loans above $100,000,
Alaska I 2%’ Twelve-and-one-half percent is the rate on real estate contracts.
Arizona 1 o% Eighteen percent is the ceiling for loans over $5000 to corporations.
Arkansas io%
California 10% Savings and loon associations, industrial loan companies, banks, credit unions, and agricultural associ-
ations are exempt from the usury law.
Colorado 12% The maximum charge an non-supervised consumer loans is 12%. On supervised loans, except for re-
volving loans, the maximum rate is the greater of 18% on all unpaid balances; or a total of 36%
on unpaid balances of $300 or less, 21% on unpaid balances over $300 and not over $1000; and
15% on unpaid balances ever $1000. The maximum rate on consumer related loans is 18%, on
revolving loans 12%, and all other loans 45%.
Connecticut 12% The ceiling rate on loans to corporations in excess of $10,000 is 18%. The 12% ceiling does not
apply to any loon mode by any national or state bank or savings & loon, to any mortgage on real
property in excess of $5,000, or made pursuant to a revolving loan agreement on which the total
principal amount owing is more than $10,000.
Delaware 9% There is no limit on collateral loans larger than $5000. Also the ceiting rate may be exceeded on
loans secured by real estate only through written agreement.
District of Columbia 8% loans guaranteed under the National Housing Act or by the VA ore exempt.
Florida Io% The ceiling is 15% for corporate loans and all other loans above $500,000.
Georgia 8% No ceiling applies an loans above $2500 to corporations and on loans above $100,000 to individuals.
toans secured by realty may carry a rate of up to 9%.
Hawaii 12%
Idaho I 0% The maximum rate on non-supervised consumer loans is 18% and on revolving loans 15%. Supervised
loans carry a maximum rote of 18% an all unpaid balances, or a total of 36% on unpaid balances
of $390 or less, 21% on unpaid balances between 5390 and $i 300, and 15% on unpaid balances
over $1300. A ceiling of 12% applies to loans of over $10,000 to corporations. Firms engaged in
agriculture may be required to pay a maximum of only io% on loans.
Illinois 8% Att corporate loans and business loans to non-profit organizatians; as well Os mortgage loans insured
by the FHA or guaranteed by the VA may be contracted for at any rate. Also secured loans greater
than $5000 may be at any rote. Effective July 12, 1974 the maximum interest rate that may be
charged on loans secured by residential real estate and entered into before July 1, 1975 was raised
to 9’/,%.
Indiana 18% A maximum rate of 18% applies to non’supervised consumer loon,, consumer related loans and
revolving loans. Supervised loans carry a maximum rate of the greater of 18% on all unpaid balances,
or a total of 36% on unpaid balances of $300 or less, 21% on unpaid balances over $300 but
under $1000, and 15% on unpaid balances over $1000. There is no maximum charge on other loans.
Iowa 9% There is no ceiling rote on either corporate loans or real estate investment trusts.
Kansas 1 o% Consumer loans other than supervised loans carry a maximum rote of 12%. The maximum charge on
supervised loons is ia% on the first $1000 and 14.45% on any additional. There is no ceiling on
any other type of loon.
Kentucky 8~/, % There is no ceiling on loans aver $25,000 which are not on a single unit family residence, No special
rate applies on loans to corporations.
Louisiana 8% Loans secured by real estate carry a maximum rate of 10%. However, loans guaranteed by Federal
agencies ore exempt from the usury laws. Corporate loans may be any rote.
Maine 1 o% No maximum rote applies if the loan is for non-personal or business purposes and the contract is in
writing and involves more than $2000.
Maryland a% No ceiling applies to business loans in excess of $5000. Residential mortgage loans may be at 10%.
Mossachusetts None
Michigan 7% No ceiling rate applies to corporote loans, realty secured loans, or federally or state approved loans.
Minnesota 8% No ceiling rote is applied to loans in excess of $100,000.
Mississippi 10% Corporations organized for profit may pay to 15% on loans in excess
0
t $2500.
Missouri 8% Corporate loans may be of any rote.
Montono
Nebraska 9% Corporate loans may be at any rote. The maximum rate is waived on certain loans by building and
loon associations, installment loans, industrial loans, and personal loans by bank and trust companies
or credit unions.
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STATE USURY LAWS’ (Cont.)
State Basic Rote Some Major Exceptions
Nevada 12%
New Hampshire None
New Jersey 8% The basic rote applies to loans under $50,000. Loans secured by realty carry o maximum of 8’4 %.
The rates are not applicable to loon contracts made by savings and loon companies, banks, or any
deportment of Housing and Urban Affairs or EHA approved loans purchased by Federal government.
New Mexico 10% A 12% ceiling applies to unsecured loans.
New York 8~,1, % Demand notes of $5000 or over with cottaterol security may carry a rate of up to 25%.
North Carolina 8% Ceiling rates on loons ore graduoted according to the size and purpose of the loans reaching 12%
on loans of $100,000 and unlimited on loans of $300,000 and larger. First mortgages on single
family dwellings may be controcted for in writing of any rote agreed upon by the parties. Corporations
may pay any rate.
North Dakota 9%3 Business loans in excess of $25,000 may corry any rote. Corporate loans regardless of size may carry
any rate.
Ohio 8% Loans in excess of $100,000 may be at any rote.
Oklahoma 10% Oklahoma’s Uniform Consumer Credit Code ollows 1 &% to supervised lenders and 10% to others
tending to consumers. There is no ceiling rote on other types of loons.
Oregon 10% loans in excess of $50,000 moy be made ot any rote. The maximum rate on loans smailer than
$50,000 is 12% for corporations and 10% for individuals and non-profit organizations.
Pennsylvania o% The maximum rote does not apply to loans of more than $50,000, loans of $50,000 or less secured
by o lien upon real property
1
loans to business corporations; unsecured, non’colloteralized loans in
excess of $35,000; and business loans in excess of $10,000. The interest rate on residential mortgages
of an original principol of $50,000 or less is o fluctuating administered rote. For July 1974 this rote
was set at 9.5%.
Rhode Island 21%
South Carolina 8% The maximum rate on loans of from $50,000 to $100,000 is io% and on loans between $100,000
and $500,000, 1 2%. Loans larger than $500,000 may be at any rote. First mortgage real estate
loans mode by savings and loan componies, the Deportment of Housing & Urban Affairs or FHA
approved mortgages ore exempt.
South Dakota 10% Corporate loans may carry any rote. However, the maximum rote on oIl loans on real estate regardless
of borrower is 10%.
Tennessee 10% The controct rate does not apply to loans extended under the Industrial Loon and Thrift Company
Act or to installment loons of banks and trust companies and building and loan associations on which
interest is deducted in odvonce and added to the principal.
Texas 10% Corporate loans above $5000 have an 18% ceiling.
Utah 18% Revolving loans and non.supervised consumer loans carry a maximum rate of 18%. Supervised loans
carry a moximum rote of 18% on all unpaid bolonces, or a total of 36% on unpaid balances of
$390 or less; 21% on unpaid bolonces over $390 and not over $1300. All other loans may be
mode at any rate.
Vermont 8%% No ceiling rate applies to loans for income producing business or activity, loans to finonce real
estate which is to be used as a primary residence or for agriculture is subject to the contract rote.
However, loans to finance real estate irnpravements or o second residence may be ot any rote.
Virginia 8% Any rote moy apply to non.agricultural loans secured by a first mortgage or realty.
Woshington 12%
West Virginia 8%
Wisconsin 12% Corporate loans may be at any rate.
Wyoming 10% Revolving loans and consumer loans other than supervised loans may carry a maximum rate of 10%.
Supervised loans may be at a role of the greater of 18% on all unpoid balances of $300 or less,
21% on unpaid balances over $300 and not over $1000, and 15% on unpaid balances over $1000.
Alt other loans may be ot ony rate.
5
This table presents a synopsis of the maze of laws concerning usury in effect in the various states and the nistrict of Colombia as of
mid-July 1974. Due to the complex nature- of this area of the la-se, the table may not be completely accurate with respect to certain specific
technical provisions, It should, however, allow the reader at least ark opportxsnity to gain some conception of the wide range of opinson
concerning interest rate regulation by virtue of the great discs’epssncy it reveals between the states as to both thcsr basic interest rate
cesliags and the nature of the exceptions to those rates,
It might also be noted that national banits arc permitted to charge m percentage point more than their Federal, Reser,e Bank’s discount
sate. At present national banks may charge at least 9 percent on loans even in states with lower usus’y ceslsngs ssnce the discount rate ss
percent.
‘The basic contract rate for loans in this state not involving real estate is -4 percentage points above the Fedesal neserve discount, rate at
the 12th district Reserve Bank ps’evailing on the first day of the month ps’eceding the commencement of the calendar quarter, the rate
for real estate contracts or commitments is 4½% above the Federal Heseswe rate, At the time of this writing that rate stands at 8%, conse-
quently the basic ceiling rates are 12% and i2½% respectively.
‘Where the parties agree in writing, interest may be charged and collected at a rate of up to 3% above the maximum bank deposit interest
rate authorized by the state banking board. However, the suuo of the 1% add-on charge and bank board established lxmst can never fall be-
low 7%, The current bank deposit interest rate limit set by the board is 6%, thus the present 9% ceiling rate on wrstten contracts,
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ceiling was sufficienfly high so as not to impinge on
market rates. As a result, the amount of new mortgage
loans made on local properties declined markedly.
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A number of District commercial banks and savings
and loan associations have found that it has been more
expedient to lend a greater share of their available
funds in the unrestricted Federal funds market than
to lend locally under oppressive ceilings. For exam-
ple, on the April 24, 1974 call report, member banks
in the Eighth District (outside eight large money
market institutions) lent a net of $368 million in
Federal funds, at a time when the effective Federal
funds rate was 10.3 percent. A year earlier, on the
March 28, 1973 call date, when the Federal funds
rate was 7.3 percent, these same banks advanced $283
millionin this market.
Available data also indicate that those who are not
covered by usury restrictions are able to attract a
larger share of available funds when market interest
rates rise relative to effective rate ceilings for others.
Eight large banks in the District advance credit to a
great extent in national money markets where lending
rates are virtually unregulated. Also, during the second
quarter of this year, total deposits of the eight large
District banks, bolstered by large CD purchases, rose
at a 36 percent annual rate, while deposits at other
member banks in the District increased at a 11.4 per-
cent rate.
The impact of usury laws on credit markets has
been made somewhat more tolerable by legal excep-
tions and other methods devised to soften the impact
of the legislation. \-Vithout such exceptions it is con-
ceivable that credit flows could virtually come to a
halt in states like Missouri when the national rate on
business loans with prime credit risk exceeds the 8
percent ceiling which prevails in this state.
In a number of jurisdictions small loan laws have
been enacted which permit higher rates on certain
small extensions of credit tvhere operating costs are
high and risk is frequently large. Many other legal
exceptions have been granted for a variety of reasons.
Retail credit charges, time-sales contracts, and loans
to out-of-town residents are subject to higher ceilings
in some states. -
In Missouri, as in a number of other states, cor-
porate businesses that are supposedly capable of pro-
tecting their interests in dealing with lenders are free
to pay any rate that they desire, As might be ex-
pected, these corporations find that they have a tie-
mendous advantage in attracting funds over unincor-
porated firms and individuals that are “protected” by
the state.
In addition, many credit market arrangements have
been devised for circumventing usury laws and per-
mitting credit flows which otherwise would be halted.
Some of these activities may be an outright violation
of the law, such as simply ignonng the ceiling, or by
calling the payment something other than interest.
llowever, violation of usury laws frequently carries
high financial penalties, such as loss of all interest or
even principal; hence, lenders are generally reluctant
to knowingly violate the statutes.
Other arrangements, which may or may not be
technically legal, but which certainly conflict with the
spirit of the law, have been adopted in order to effec-
tively adjust a loan made at the legal rate to the
market rate. One method is to lend to those who in
some other way help you. Examples include the prac-
tice by lenders of favoring customers who maintain
compensating deposit balances or whose firm does.
The effective rate on mortgages has traditionally
been adjusted upward through the use of “points”
charged either to the buyer, tile seller, or both, At
times, loans have been granted by third parties at
the legal rate, after which the real lender then pur-
chases the loan at a discount. Other loans have
been “closed” in a more liberal location, such as across
a state line. Such techniques, although permitting
credit to flow, run risks of illegality, are inefficient,
and probably cause effective rates to be slightly higher
to tile borrower and lower to the saver than they
would be in a free market setting.
Lenders in states with low usury ceilings also have
an option of moving funds into a state with more
liberal laws, Comments from managers of funds indi-
cate that the interstate movement of funds because
of usury laws is sizable. Investment funds leave the
state to finance mortgages in other states and to buy
notes and bonds. Also, banks and savings and loan
associations “sell” net sizable amounts of day-to-day
Federal funds in the national money markets, This
alternative of lending in another state protects large
lenders to some extent and makes funds more readily
available in states with liberal usury ceilings. How-
ever, such movements tend to be inefficient since
credit is extended to less urgent projects and the cost
of administering the loan is increased. Also, in the
low ceiling state borrowers find credit still more dif-
ficult to obtain, lenders with small amounts are forced
to accept lower yields, and economic activity suffers.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST 1974
Ceilings on interest rates are relics of ancient and
medieval thought, and have survived to the present
largely because of a lack of confidence in market forces
or because of a presumed benefit to higher credit risks.
Actually, supply and demand for funds, rather than
rate controls, have been the chief forces holding in-
terest rates at existing levels,
Ceilings on rates may, at times, be of some benefit
to bon’owers easily deceived by unscrupulous lenders.
However, usury laws cause a loss of individual free-
dom, and in modern economies they are disruptive,
especially during periods of inflation when interest
rates, like other prices, rise. Usury laws are based on
false premises, operate perversely, and are economi-
cally inefficient. The cheap money which cannot be
obtained is of little usefulness.
Effective usury ceilings, which alter the flow of
funds, retard economic growth. The low maximums
tend to prevent credit from flowing to higher risk
individuals and businesses. Funds available are chan-
nelled into well-established, low- risk functions. As a
result, innovation is discouraged, economic progress
is slowed, and competition is reduced. The recognition
that usury laws are burdensome, inequitable, and
cause funds to leave the jurisdiction has led some
states to relax the law.
Controls also adversely affect the saver, since they
deny him the right to a competitive return on his
funds. This is especially true of smaller savers. Those
with large amounts of savings can more easily by-pass
the controlled market by investing in uncontrolled
central money and capital markets. Not only is the
saver of moderate means injured, but the economy
also loses as he becomes discouraged and saves less.